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"I WANT MY FILE": SURVEILLANCE DATA,
MINIMIZATION, AND HISTORICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Douglas Cox *
INTRODUCTION

Revelations of secret National Security Agency ("NSA") intelligence collection programs and other federal and state surveillance programs have reignited the debate over the relative value
of individual privacy rights and national security. This article argues that in this debate greater attention must be paid to the
"right to know"-both the individual's "right to know" what records the government collects on them and the public's "right to
know" the scope of government surveillance programs-and that
federal recordkeeping laws are the appropriate legal mechanism
to ensure both long-term government accountability and the historical record.
If government surveillance records are destroyed rather than
retained, the ability to hold the government accountable for the
collection of that information is greatly diminished. In the debate
over publicly disclosed NSA programs, however, "both sides" of
the privacy versus security debate appear to agree that the government should destroy these records and the debate is limited to
how short the retention period ought to be. Plaintiffs in cases
challenging these collection programs have sought as a primary
remedy the immediate destruction, expungement, or purge of records and data.' The government, in turn, has defended the legali*

Attorney and Law Library Professor, City University of New York School of Law.

The author previously worked in intelligence while serving in the United States Army.
This article underwent prepublication review by the National Security Agency and was
cleared for publication. The views expressed are only those of the author.
1. See, e.g., Complaint, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2008) (seeking order "requiring the destruction of all copies of' plaintiffs' communications
seized by the government); Complaint at 10, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 (S.D.N.Y. June
11, 2013) (seeking order to NSA "to purge from their possession all of the call records of
Plaintiffs communications"); Complaint at 31-32, Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-881 (D.D.C.
June 11, 2013) (seeking order that plaintiffs phone and internet records be "expunged
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ty of these programs by highlighting compliance with "minimization" procedures that include limited retention periods for certain
data as a method for ameliorating privacy concerns The government has openly promoted its intention to destroy all of the
data obtained through its bulk telephony metadata program.'
This apparent consensus, that surveillance records should be
destroyed in order to protect privacy rights, is in tension with a
long history of individuals fighting to preserve government records-particularly those that have violated their privacy rightsboth in order to access the records and to ensure accountability
for surveillance programs. Famously, in 1989, following the fall of
the Berlin Wall, East German citizens marched on offices of the
Stasi in order to prevent the destruction of their files.4 Their motto was "I want my file!"-an assertion of the "right to know."'
The statutory representative of the "right to know" in United
States law is the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). In the aftermath of public disclosures of sweeping domestic surveillance
programs, many individuals have demanded their "files" under
both FOIA and analogous state freedom of information laws. In
2013, for example, the NSA reported an 888 percent increase in
the number of FOIA and Privacy Act requests from individuals

from federal government records.").
2. See, e.g., Official Statement, Office of Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Release of 2015
Section 702 Minimization Procedures (Aug. 11, 2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.
com/post/148797010498/release -of-2015 -section-702-minimization ("These procedures are
intended to protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons .... ").
3. See Press Release, Office of Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, ODNI Announces Transition
to New Telephone Metadata Program (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/2 10-press-releases-2015/1292-odni-announces-transition-to-newtelephone-metadata-program ("NSA will destroy the Section 215 bulk telephony metadata
as soon as possible upon expiration of its litigation preservation obligations.").
4. See Stephen Kinzer, East Germans Face Their Accusers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr.
12, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/12/magazine/east-germans-face-their-accusers.
html?pagewanted=all.
5. Id. The issue of retention or destruction of records of state security services after
the fall of repressive regimes has arisen with some frequency. While some countries have
decided to destroy such records to protect privacy, others have preserved them for purposes of accountability and history. See ANTONIO GONZALEZ QUINTANA, ARCHIVAL POLICIES IN
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 50-55 (2009), http://www.ica.org/sites/default/files/Re
port Gonzalez-QuintanaEN.pdf (discussing historical examples and arguing for preservation).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012 & Supp. I 2014); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-73 (1989) (stating FOIA enforces the
rights of citizens to be information about what "their government is up to") (quoting Envtl.
Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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wanting to know what records the NSA maintained on them.7 The
NSA's response to these requests was the so-called "Glomar" response, in which the agency asserts that it can neither confirm
nor deny whether any such records exist based on national security concerns.'
In such cases, an individual's and the public's "right to know"
may only fully ripen years, if not decades, in the future when sensitive surveillance records and classified programs are declassified. The NSA's intent to destroy records responsive to such requests, however,-purportedly in order to protect their privacy
rights-will thwart these individuals from ever fully satisfying
their right to know the extent of government surveillance of their
communications and the public may never know the full breadth
or scope of these programs, as the historical record may become
sanitized.
The subtitle of this symposium-"Are We Heading Toward Big
Brother?"-is a particularly apt reference here. In George Orwell's 1984, the main protagonist Winston Smith was an employee in the Records Department of the Ministry of Truth and part of
his responsibilities included destroying historical records in order
to shape history to conform with the narrative of the Party.9
The dynamic is illustrated with Noam Chomsky's "nonexistent"
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") file. In response to a researcher's FOIA requests seeking CIA records on Chomsky, the
CIA responded not with a "Glomar" response, but with a substantive response stating that "despite thorough and diligent" searches no responsive records were located. ° The response left the impression that the CIA had never maintained records on Chomsky.

7. See Yamiche Alcindor, NSA Grapples with Huge Increase in Records Requests,
USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/17/nsagrapples-with-988-increase-in-open-records-requests/3519889/.
8. See Marisa Taylor & Jonathan S. Landay, Americans Find Swift Stonewall on
Whether NSA Vacuumed Their Data, MCCLATCHY (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.mcclatchy
dc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article24763393.html. The use of a
"Glomar" response was first recognized in a FOIA case involving CIA records related to a
submarine ship called the "Glomar Explorer." Phillippi v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 546
F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
9. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 44 (Kindle ed., Planet eBook 2004)
(1949) ("And if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed-if all records told the
same tale-then the lie passed into history and became the truth.").
10. John Hudson, The CIA Has Nothing on Noam Chomsky (No, Really), FOREIGN
POL'Y (Feb. 27, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/27/the-cia-has-nothing-on-noamchomsky-no-really/.
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"The CIA Has Nothing on Noam Chomsky (No, Really)," read one
headline. 1'
Months later, however, the CIA revised its FOIA response
when the FBI found a copy of a CIA record referencing Chomsky
and forwarded it to the CIA. 2 As it turned out, a number of historical CIA records provided to, and preserved by, the House Select Committee on Assassinations not only referenced Chomsky,
but also indicated that he was a person of interest in Operation
CHAOS, a CIA program targeting the activities of anti-war protestors during the Vietnam War. 3
Ultimately, the reason why the CIA had no records on Chomsky in response to FOIA requests in 2014 was because the CIA
destroyed records on United States persons from Operation
CHAOS in 1978 with the justification that destroying them was
necessary to protect the privacy of those individuals. 4 The effect,
though, undermined the public's understanding of the full extent
of the program."
To be clear, different government collection programs and different groups of surveillance records and data deserve different
treatment. There are meaningful differences between traditional
hardcopy records documenting physical surveillance, on one
hand, and petabytes of incidentally collected raw data on the other, which may alter the question of whether retention is necessary or desirable to ensure historical accountability. Yet, under
current procedures, even records that the National Archives and

11. Id.
12. John Hudson, Exclusive: After Multiple Denials, CIA Admits to Snooping on Noam
Chomsky, FOREIGN POL'Y (Aug. 13, 2013), http:/lforeignpolicy.com/2013/08/13/exclusiveafter-multiple-denials-cia-admits-to-snooping-on-noam-chomsky/.
13. Douglas Cox, More CIA Records on Noam Chomsky the CIA Could Not Find,
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.docexblog.com2013/10/more-ciarecords-on-noam-chomsky-cia.html. The collection of CIA records provided to the House
Select Committee on Assassinations is known as the CIA "Segregated Collection" and has
been digitized and placed online by the Mary Ferrell Foundation. See CIA Records Project,
MARY FERRELL FOUND., http://www.maryferrell.org/pages/FeaturedCIARecordsProject.
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
14. The destruction of the files was authorized by the Archivist of the United States.
CIA, Request for Records Disposition Authority, No. NC1-263-78-1 (Mar. 17, 1978)
http://www.dcoxfiles.com/nc1263781.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 113 F. Supp.
3d 313, 334 n.12 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that even if the government had officially acknowledged the collection program at issue, which might have made collected records subject to
FOIA, "the NSA has stated that all records obtained through the program have been destroyed").

2017]

I WANT MY FILE

Records Administration ("NARA") has assessed as having such
historical and legal value that they should be preserved permanently can be summarily destroyed based on orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") that fail to consider
the value of those records for purposes other than intelligence. 6
This article argues that limitations on government retention of
surveillance data designed to ameliorate privacy concerns must
be more meaningfully reconciled with the federal recordkeeping
laws, which ensure an objective evaluation of the long-term value
of government records and the protection of the "right to know"
for individuals and the public. Part I provides relevant background by briefly reviewing the baseline legal regime governing
the preservation of federal records 7 and a brief history of repeated attempts to evade these legal requirements in the context of
government surveillance records. Part II describes how such evasions argue for applying heightened scrutiny to documentation of
modern surveillance programs and how both the FISC and NARA
have inadequately addressed the intersection of, and conflict between, retention minimization and the recordkeeping laws. Part
III lays out provisional recommendations for balancing the protection of privacy, the "right to know," and historical accountability.

I. FEDERAL RECORDS LAW AND THEIR EVASION
The federal records laws are designed to provide a comprehensive framework for the creation, maintenance, and final "disposition" of federal records, which can include either destruction or
preservation in the National Archives."8 These laws aim to preserve accountability and the historical record by requiring assessments of the legal, historical, and research value of govern-

16. See infra notes 73-94 and accompanying text.
17. This article will focus on federal law for the sake of clarity and convenience. Many
state records laws and freedom of information laws are based on the federal counterparts,
although often with variations that are beyond the scope of this article.
18. The federal records laws are frequently referred to as the "Federal Records Act,"
although the relevant statutory provisions derive from several different acts, including the
Records Disposal Act of 1943, the Federal Records Act of 1950, and the Federal Records
Management Amendments of 1976. Records Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 78-115, 57 Stat. 380
(1943) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3314 (2012 & Supp. II 2015)); Federal
Records Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-754, § 6, 64 Stat. 578; Federal Records Management
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-575, 90 Stat. 2723 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2907 (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
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ment records by both the agencies that create them and the Archivist of the United States (the "Archivist") prior to their destruction.19 Such requirements serve the statutory goal of preserving "[a]ccurate and complete documentation of the policies and
transactions of the Federal Government. 20
As described below, despite these broad goals, there is a long
history of agencies ignoring or actively evading recordkeeping
laws especially in the context of government surveillance activities with constitutional implications. The courts have recognized,
for example, that "agencies, left to themselves, have a built-in incentive to dispose of records relating to 'mistakes' or, less nefariously, just do not think about preserving 'information necessary
to protect the legal and financial rights ... of persons directly affected by the agency's activities."'2
A. FederalRecords Laws
Contrary to the popular notion that agencies can avoid records
by carrying out business over the phone or in person, the federal
records laws expressly obligate agencies to create records. In particular, the law requires that agencies "shall make and preserve
records containing adequate and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the agency."" This duty creates a floor that
the courts have described as a basic duty "to create and then retain a baseline inventory of 'essential' records."'2 The same provision further defines this duty by requiring that such "adequate
and proper documentation" be designed to "furnish the information necessary to protect the legal and financial rights" not only of the government, but also of "persons directly affected by the
agency's activities.' 4

19. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3303-3303a (2012 & Supp. II 2015); see also Armstrong v. Exec.
Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1285, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (referencing "Congress'
evident concern with preserving a complete record of government activity for historical and
other uses").
20. 44 U.S.C. § 2902 (2012).
21. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting 44
U.S.C. § 3101 (2012)).
22. 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012) (emphasis added).
23. See Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1286.
24. 44 U.S.C. § 3101.
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The federal records laws further require that agencies establish
"safeguards against the removal or loss of records" and instruct
agency employees that agency records may not be "alienated or
destroyed" except in compliance with the federal records laws.2 5
These laws place an affirmative duty on the agency to "notify the
Archivist of any actual, impending, or threatened unlawful removal... or other destruction of records. 26
Regarding the disposal of records, the basic rule is agencies
may not destroy any federal records unless and until the Archivist has approved of such destruction.2 7 In practice, agencies submit proposed lists or schedules of records identifying categories of
agency records. With these proposed schedules, agencies also
propose whether each category should be either permanent records-which will eventually be transferred to the National Archives-or temporary records. "8 If the latter, the agency will propose retention periods that can range from instructions to destroy
immediately or to retain for a period of time, then destroy.29 Such
temporary records should consist of those that "do not appear to
have sufficient value to warrant their further preservation by the
Government" when they are no longer "needed by [the agency] in
the transaction of its current business.2 0
Agency assessments of the value of federal records are not,
however, dispositive. NARA examines these proposed schedules
and undertakes an independent assessment of the value of the
categories of records."' The standard is similarly whether the categories listed as temporary records "do not, or will not after the

25. 44 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
26. Id. § 3106 (2012 & Supp. II 2015). Crucially, the requirement to maintain and preserve records applies to all records, not just those necessary to satisfy the baseline "adequate and proper documentation" standard. See, e.g., Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1286-87 (holding that the federal records laws "mandate that all records" be preserved "whether or not
related to 'adequate documentation"' and they can only be destroyed "in accordance with
explicit statutory directives"); Rohrbough v. Harris, 549 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 2008).
27. See 44 U.S.C. § 3314 (2012) (stating that the statutory procedures "are exclusive,
and records of the United States Government may not be alienated or destroyed except
under this chapter"); see also Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1278 (stating the federal records laws
prescribe "the exclusive mechanism for disposal of federal records").
28. See 36 C.F.R. § 1220.18 (2016) (defining permanent record and temporary record).
29. See Records Control Schedules (RCS), NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.
gov/records-mgmt/rcs/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). For examples of records schedules approved by the Archivist, with retention periods such as five, ten, twenty, or thirty years,
see 36 C.F.R. § 1220.12 (2016) (describing the records scheduling and appraisal process).
30. 44 U.S.C. § 3303 (2012 & Supp. I12015).
31. Id. § 3303a(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
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lapse of the period specified, have sufficient administrative, legal,
research, or other value to warrant their continued preservation
by the Government."32 NARA's review of proposed records schedules and record retention periods may include reviewing the covered records, or samples thereof, and sometimes involves lengthy
negotiations with the agency if there is disagreement."
If and when there is agreement on an agency records schedule,
the Archivist signs it and "empower[s] the agency to dispose of
those records" in accordance with the schedule." NARA also proactively promulgates records schedules designed to cover generic
types of routine records common to all agencies in schedules
called General Records Schedules. 5
In sum, the federal records laws are designed to involve a neutral arbiter of the value of agency records to try to ensure that
they are preserved or destroyed based on whether they are valuable, rather than whether they reflect positively on an agency. As
one early National Archives leader noted, "[a]n archivist is not an
interested party with respect to the preservation of evidence,
whether favorable or unfavorable to an agency's administration.
He will not judge of its partiality; he is interested only in preserving all the important evidence."3
B. A Primer on Evading Records Laws
For as long as there have been federal recordkeeping laws,
however, there have been attempts to evade them, especially in
the context of traditional government surveillance records. The
techniques employed include finding ways to exclude documents
from the federal records laws altogether or taking advantage of
ambiguities in approved schedules in order destroy records that
would otherwise be problematic to an agency. A brief review of
several such techniques follows.

32. Id.
33. See Steven Aftergood, National Archives Tackles Email Management, FAS.ORG
(Apr. 10, 2015), http://fas.orgblogs/secrecy/2015/O4/nara-capstone/(noting "trade offs"
must be made to ensure an e-mail management regime).
34. 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a).
35. Id. § 3303a(d) (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 1220.12(d) (2016) (noting that the Archivist "issues General Records Schedules (GRS) authorizing disposition, after specified periods of
time, of records common to several or all Federal agencies").
36.

T.R. SCHELLENBERG, MODERN ARCHIVES: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 29 (1956).
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1. "Do Not File" Procedures
For decades, the FBI utilized special "Do Not File" procedures
in which certain records were maintained outside of normal agency filing systems in order to limit their accessibility and retention.37 As described by historian Athan Theoharis:
Under these procedures, extremely sensitive FBI documents were
not serialized and were filed separately, so that they could be destroyed or denied. Under a "Do Not File" procedure, FBI officials
could affirm that a search of the central files disclosed no additional
documents (particularly pertaining to the Bureau's illegal or "embarrassing" activities). 3s

The FBI's use of "black bag jobs," for example, which involved
surreptitiously entering private property without a warrant were
handled under such "Do Not File" procedures with the result that
"[n]o permanent records were kept for approvals" of such operations and after review, "these records were destroyed."39
2. Nonrecords
Another technique is the expansive use of what ought to be a
limited, technical carve-out from the federal recordkeeping laws
for nonrecords or nonrecord material. The significance of an
agency categorizing documents or data as a nonrecord is that it
removes such material from the integrated legal framework for
federal records and allows the agency to destroy it at its discretion.4 °
Under the federal records laws, "records" are defined quite
broadly to include:

37. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF

AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755 (2d Sess. 1976), at 148-49, (describing "Do Not File" proce-

dure as a "special filing system" that allowed documentation of "illegal operations" such as
"break-ins" and surveillance to be "systematically destroyed") [hereinafter

CHURCH

REPORT BOOK II].

38.

Athan G. Theoharis, In-House Cover-up: Researching FBI Files, in BEYOND THE

HISS CASE: THE FBI, CONGRESS AND THE COLD WAR 20, 21-22 (Athan G. Theoharis ed.,

1982).
39. CHURCH REPORT BOOK II, supra note 37, at 61-62.
40. 36 C.F.R. § 1222.16(b)(3) (2016) ("Nonrecord materials should be purged when no
longer needed for reference. NARA's approval is not required to destroy such materials.").
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[A]ll recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics,
made or received by a Federal agency under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency .. as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or
other activities of the United States Government or because of the
informational value of data in them.41

Nonrecords are documentary materials that fail to satisfy even
this broad definition. NARA regulations define "nonrecord materials" as "U.S. Government-owned documentary materials that do
not meet the conditions of records status. ' 42 The original concept
of nonrecords arose innocently enough. A portion of the legislative
history of the Records Disposal Act of 1943, which provided the
original definition of records that remains largely intact, indicated that Congress wanted to "make it clear that [agencies] are not
obliged to consider every scrap of paper on which writing or printing appears as a record. 43
The concept of nonrecords, however, expanded over time based
on increasingly broad determinations that documents failed to
meet even the low hurdle of the definition of record on the basis
that they were not "appropriate for preservation." 4 A NARA Task
Force in 1988 noted, for example, a "trend" following the passage
of FOIA, in which "a number of agencies attempted to exclude
certain types of information from disclosure by labeling the materials containing such information as nonrecord" given that FOIA
applies to agency records.
The most egregious example of the expansive use of the nonrecord category is the CIA's destruction of videotapes depicting the
brutal interrogations of detainees.4 6 A CIA spokesperson publicly
explained the CIA's position by stating, "[tihe bottom line is that
the[ ] tapes were not federal records as defined by the Federal
Records Act.'47 NARA recently reopened an inquiry into whether
41.

44 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1)(A) (2016).

42.

36 C.F.R. § 1222.14 (2015).

43. H.R. REP. NO. 78-559, at 1 (1943), reprinted in 1943 U.S.C.C.S. 2-140, 2-141; see
also NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., NARA AND FEDERAL RECORDS: LAWS AND
AUTHORITIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 6 (1988)
44. NARA TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 7.

[hereinafter

NARA TASK FORCE].

45. Id. at 6.
46. See generally Douglas Cox, Burn After Viewing: The CIA's Destruction of the Abu
Zubaydah Tapes and the Law of Federal Records, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POLY 131
(2011).
47. Michael Isikoff, The CIA and the Archives, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.
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the CIA tape destruction constituted an authorized destruction of
federal records, the results of which are not yet public."
3. "Approved" Destruction
Another frequent issue is agency destruction of records pursuant to an Archivist-approved records schedule that is either misunderstood or misapplied (intentionally or inadvertently). In the
late 1990s, for example, a New York Times article revealed that
the CIA had destroyed records related to its involvement in the
1953 coup in Iran.4 As a result, NARA began an inquiry into the
possible unauthorized destruction of records."0 In response, the
CIA claimed that any destruction had been authorized by records
schedules approved by the Archivist.5 NARA concluded, however,
"no schedules in effect" when the records were destroyed "provided for the disposal of records relating to covert actions and therefore the destruction of records relating to Iran was unauthorized. , 2
Sometimes the relevant records schedule, or what records they
cover, is difficult to discern. In 2010, for example, an employee alleged that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had
been improperly destroying investigative records, which prompted several investigations.53 The records at issue documented
"matters under inquiry," which are an early part of the SEC investigative process.' One problem was discerning whether these
records were subject to an Archivist-approved records schedule

newsweek.com/cia-and-archives-94445.
48. See Douglas Cox, The CIA and the Unfinished National Archives Inquiry, JURIST
(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.jurist.org/forun/2012/10/douglas-cox-cia-records.php; Michael
Isikoff, CIA Faces Second Probe Over Videotape Destruction, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40115878/ns/us-news-security/t/cia-faces-second-probe-overvideotape-destruction. The author currently has an outstanding FOIA request for any additional records related to the NARA inquiry.
49. Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran Coup, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/29/us/cia-destroyed-files-on- 1953-iran-coup.html.
50. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., RECORDS MANAGEMENT IN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 29 n. 1 (2000).
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See David S. Hilzenrath, A Different Story Emerges on SEC Record Purges, WASH.
POST (Sept. 5, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-different-stor
y-emerges-on-sec-record-purges/2011/09/02/gIQALBh44J story.html?utmterm=.6f654f0b
5b3f.
54. Id.
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that required a twenty-five-year retention period for "preliminary
investigations" or whether they were not covered by any records
schedule.5 The SEC Office of Inspector General ultimately found
that the SEC destroyed documents that should have been preserved as federal records. 6
Finally, there have been situations in which records schedules
approved by the Archivist are found by a court to be inadequate
and not in compliance with federal records laws. The D.C. Circuit,
for example, held that an Archivist-approved FBI schedule, which
allowed the FBI to screen investigative files, selecting some for
retention and others for destruction based on certain criteria,
failed to comply with the law. 7 In particular, the court held that
the schedule did not adequately comply with the obligation to
preserve information "pertaining to the legal rights of persons directly affected by the FBI's activities.5 8
II. SECRET SURVEILLANCE DATA AND RECORDKEEPING
This history of government attempts at evading recordkeeping
laws for traditional surveillance activities can lead to reasonable
questions about whether any presumption of good faith is appropriate when the government justifies the destruction of modern
surveillance data on privacy grounds, or whether such justifications could be pretextual. At the very least, it is reasonable to approach retention policies related to such data with caution. This
includes the status of surveillance data under the federal records
laws as well as minimization procedures limiting retention of collected data that are designed to minimize privacy intrusions, but
which can also risk minimizing the right to know and historical
accountability.

55.

Id.

56. SEC. EXCHANGE COMM., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION,
CASE No. OIG-567, DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS RELATED TO MATTERS UNDER INQUIRY AND
INCOMPLETE STATEMENTS TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
REGARDING THAT DESTRUCTION BY THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 2 (2011).

57.

Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

58. Id. at 36. The district court had gone even further, finding that "it is clear that the
FOIA influenced the drafting" of the schedule and "reflected a bias, on impermissible
grounds, in favor of the destruction rather than the preservation of government records."
Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 485 F. Supp. 222, 233 (D.D.C. 1980).
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A. Data as Nonrecords and Records Schedules
One issue is the extent to which agencies are treating increasingly sophisticated forms of surveillance data as records subject
to the federal records laws or as nonrecords. In 2015, as one example, documents released via FOIA revealed that the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") had been using a Stingray system, a
"cell-site simulator" that mimics cell phone towers, in order to
help determine the location of specific mobile phones. 9 In a July
2016 Privacy Impact Assessment, the IRS addressed its use of
Stingrays and provided a rare glimpse into the retention of such
data.0 In response to the question of whether Stingray data was
covered under an "archivist approved" records schedule "for the
retention and destruction of official agency records stored in this
system," the IRS indicated it was not.6 1 "Data from the Stingray is
purged after completion of the operation," the IRS stated, on the
basis that "[i]t is not the official repository for data and documents and does not require National Archives approval to affect
data disposition."62 The IRS further noted, without explanation,
that "[a]ny new records generated by the system" would be made
subject to the IRS records management program.63 Therefore,
where the line is being drawn between nonrecords and records for
such data remains opaque.
Similarly, even when certain forms of data are treated as records subject to the records laws, agencies can fail to provide clarity about which records schedules or which retention periods apply. In 2014, for example, the Law Library of Congress conducted
a global survey of laws regarding the collection of biometric data
of passport applicants and passport holders.6 4 The study covered
types of biometric databases, the purposes of those databases, access restrictions related to them, and the duration of data reten-

59. Nicky Woolf & William Green, IRS Possessed Stingray Cellphone Surveillance
Gear, Documents Reveal, THE GuARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/oct/26/stingray-surveillance-technology-irs-cellphone-tower.
60. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PRIVACY IMPACT STATEMENT NO. 1832 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ci-use-stingray2-pia.pdf.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BIOMETRIC DATA RETENTION FOR PASSPORT
APPLICANTS AND HOLDERS 1 (2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/biometric-data-retention

/biometric-passport-data-retention.pdf.
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tion." While the Law Library of Congress was able to locate definitive retention periods for a number of other countries, it was unable to verify how long the United States Department of State retains such biometric records."6 In a lengthy footnote, the authors
explained that the records schedule cited by the Department of
State included a wide variety of different categories of records
whose retention periods varied from permanent to six months "to
be destroyed 'when active agency use ceases' and it was unclear
which applied. 7 Thus, as far as the public knows, the State Department may be retaining biometric data for somewhere between six months and forever.
B. FISC,Minimization, and FederalRecords
A more wide-ranging example is the interaction-or disconnect-between Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA")
minimization procedures and the federal records laws. As explained in more detail below, the recordkeeping laws essentially
fall through the cracks; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court ("FISC") basically ignores these laws in approving minimization procedures, while NARA-tasked with enforcing the records laws-largely defers to the minimization procedures the
FISC imposes.
1. FISA Retention Minimization
Minimization procedures, which are a feature of both Title III
wiretaps and FISA, are generally designed to minimize the overcollection, use, and-in the FISA context-retention of surveillance data. 8 Controversies over minimization procedures have
largely centered on whether they are effective at protecting privacy or whether excessive exceptions and loopholes undermine their
usefulness and purpose.6 9

65. Id.
66. Id. at 8 ("No clear statement is provided regarding the duration of the storage of
data .....
67. Id. at 13 n.83.
68. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012) (establishing standards for Title III wiretaps
to "minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter"); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (defining "minimization procedures" under
FISA).
69. See, e.g., Jake Laperruque, Updates to Section 702 Minimization Rules Still Leave
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FISA defines minimization procedures, in relevant part, as:
specific procedures ...that are reasonably designed in light of the
purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize
the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United
States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.70

FISA minimization procedures publicly released by the Director of National Intelligence provide examples of retention minimization. Under such procedures, for example, certain FISAacquired data "will be destroyed upon recognition," while other
data "may not be retained longer than" two years or five years or
some other period.7 1 Retention periods for data under certain
FISA programs, moreover, remain classified. Under FBI minimization procedures for section 702 collection, for example, certain
FISA-acquired information "shall be destroyed [redacted] from
the expiration date of the certification authorizing the collection. 72
The incomplete reconciliation between FISA minimization and
other preservation obligations was highlighted in a remarkable
series of FISC opinions dealing with the relevance of FISAacquired data in other litigation. In 2014, the government filed an
ex parte motion seeking an amendment to the minimization procedures for section 215 metadata collection based on other pending, non-FISC civil lawsuits. 73 The then-existing minimization
Loopholes, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Feb. 9, 2015), https://cdt.org/blog/updates-tosection-702-minimization-rules-still-leave-loopholes/. Regarding Title III minimization
procedures, see Seth M. Hyatt, Text Offenders: Privacy, Text Messages, and the Failureof
the Title III Minimization Requirements, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1351 (2011) ("Courts have
spent more than twenty years watering [minimization requirements] down, leaving behind a bizarre, hollowed-out protection that serves as a procedural nuisance to law enforcement without providing meaningful protection to individual privacy.").
70. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 7 [hereinafter NSA SECTION 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES],

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015NSAMinimizationProceduresRedacted.pdf.
72. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 23, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015

FBIMinimizationProcedures.pdf.
73. In re Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things, at 1-2, No. BR 14-01 (FISA Ct., Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/BR%2014-01%o20Opinion-1.pdf.
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procedures required that collected telephone metadata would be
"destroyed no later than five years (60 months) after its initial
collection."74 The government's motion sought authorization for
retention longer than five years-subject to additional access and
use restrictions-"while six civil matters currently pending in
various courts are litigated."7
The FISC initially denied the proposed amendment to the minimization procedures on the grounds that, as the government led
the court to believe, the only conflicting preservation obligation at
issue was the "general obligation of civil litigants to preserve records that could potentially serve as evidence." 6 The FISC reasoned that because minimization procedures were required by
statute they "displaced" the "general obligation to preserve records that may be relevant to civil matters," because the latter is
only "a matter of federal common law."7 The FISC later reversed
this decision, however, and allowed longer retention, subject to
additional restrictions, after plaintiffs in the non-FISC cases obtained restraining orders against the government's data destruction.78
Those plaintiffs also formally advised the FISC of other cases
and earlier preservation orders the government had failed to disclose in its initial ex parte motion to the FISC 9 The FISC then
issued an order questioning the government's compliance with
the duty of candor, stating that the government "should have
made the FISC aware of the preservation orders."8 The FISC
added that "[n]ot only did the government fail to do so" but that
documents filed by the plaintiffs suggested that "the government
sought to dissuade plaintiffs' counsel from immediately raising
this issue with the FISC."1 The FISC ordered the government to
explain "why it failed to notify [the FISC] of the preservation orders."82 In response, the government filed a mea culpa stating
that "[w]ith the benefit of hindsight, the Government recognizes"
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
Things,
79.
Things,
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 2 (quoting minimization procedures).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3-4.
In re Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
No. BR 14-01, at 3-5 (FISA Ct., Mar. 12, 2014).
In re Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
No. BR 14-01, at 4-6 (FISA Ct., Mar. 21, 2014).
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
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that "it should have made [the FISC] aware of those preservation
orders" and "regrets its omission.""
The FISC's attempt at balancing preservation obligations conflicting with FISA minimization procedures was remarkable for
several reasons. First, the FISC essentially treated the request as
an issue of first impression, which seems to confirm that the
FISC had not previously considered how to reconcile retention
minimization with conflicting preservation duties in earlier opinions, many of which remain classified.84 In the end, the court's
analysis simply fell back on a generic canon that federal common
law "may be displaced by statute whenever Congress speaks directly to the issue."8 5
Second, the FISC very narrowly interpreted the duty to preserve relevant evidence by confining its analysis only to the specific pending cases of which it was made aware by the government.8" The duty to preserve relevant evidence, however, extends
not only to pending cases, but also to reasonably foreseeable litigation.87 Indeed, the first case the FISC cited for the duty to preserve relevant evidence was Kronisch v. United States.8 In
Kronisch, the Second Circuit held that the CIA could be subject to
spoliation sanctions for destroying evidence of its MKULTRA
program, in which the CIA administered LSD to individuals
without their knowledge. 8 This holding was despite the fact that
the events at issue in Kronisch occurred in 1952, the destruction

83. Response of the United States of America to the Court's March 21, 2014 Opinion
and Order at 2, In re Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production
of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01 (FISA Ct., Apr. 2, 2014).
84. See In re Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14.01, at 3, 8 n.7 (FISA Ct., Mar. 7, 2014) (stating that the "Court has
not found any case law supporting the government's broad assertion" and that "cited legislative history sheds no light on what is before the Court").
85. Id. at 4 (citing Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 423 (2011)).
86. See In re Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14.01, at 6 (FISA Ct., Mar. 12, 2014) (requiring retention "[plending
resolution of the preservation issues" in specific cases).
87. See, e.g., West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)
(defining spoliation as the destruction of evidence "in pending or reasonably foreseeable
litigation"). See generally MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
(Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 2013) (discussing federal and state law spoliation issues).
88. In re Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things, No. BR 14.01, at 2-3 (FISA Ct., Mar. 7, 2014).
89. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
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of the documents occurred in 1973, and the case was not brought
until ten years later in 1983. 90
Third, the FISC made no mention of the federal records laws,
which provide a potentially conflicting statutory basis for preserving records based on a far more comprehensive assessment of
their legal, administrative, and historical value. 9 Indeed, litigation preservation obligations themselves-dismissed by the FISC
as mere "common law"-are incorporated by statute, regulation,
and records schedules into the federal records laws. Federal criminal law makes willfully and unlawfully destroying federal records a felony,92 the federal records laws require agencies to undertake administrative
efforts
to prevent such unlawful
destruction,9 3 and NARA regulations define such unlawful destruction to include the "disposal of a record subject to" a "litigation hold, or any other hold requirement to retain the records."9 4
Following this series of FISC opinions, subsequent FISA minimization procedures contain an exception from destruction for
situations in which "the Department of Justice advises NSA in
writing that such information is subject to a preservation obligation in pending or anticipated administrative, civil, or criminal
litigation."9 Indeed, in the context of FISA Section 215 data, the
sole reason the government has not yet destroyed all of the telephone metadata collected under the program is due to a carve-out
for such ongoing litigation.96

90. The CIA's justification for the destruction of the documents was claimed to be, in
part, to "preserve the confidential identities of outside participants in the MKULTRA program" and to "prevent incomplete documents from being misunderstood." Id. at 127.
91. See supra Part I.A.
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012) ("Whoever willfully and unlawfully... destroys...
any record.., shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or
both.").
93. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3105-06 (2012 & Supp. II 2015) (requiring agency heads to establish safeguards against the loss of records, advise employees of penalties for the "unlawful
removal or destruction of records," and "notify the Archivist of any actual, impending, or
threatened unlawful removal, defacing, alteration or destruction of records").
94. 36 C.F.R. § 1230.3(h) (2015). As another example, the CIA has an Archivistapproved schedule that requires the preservation of "[r]ecords relating to actual or impending litigation." See CIA, Request for Records Disposition Authority, No. NC1-263-851, (Mar. 26, 1985), http://www.dcoxfiles.com/851.pdf.
95. See, e.g., NSA SECTION 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supranote 71, at 8.
96. Office of the Dir. of National Intel, Minimization ProceduresApplicable to the Retention of Bulk Metadata Producedas Part of the Section 215 Program,IC ON THE RECORD,
(Jul. 25, 2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/147962934793/minimization-proce
dures-applicable-to ("Although the government is no longer accessing bulk metadata produced by telecommunications providers under the Section 215 program for analytic pur-
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The question becomes whether and why the FISC and the minimization procedures should limit such an exception to the specific scenario of litigation holds, rather than extending it to incorporate records responsive to FOIA requests or broader retention
categories under the federal records laws.
2. NARA and Retention Minimization
While the FISC has not addressed or acknowledged the possible impact of federal recordkeeping laws in approving minimization procedures, NARA has simultaneously deferred to such
court-imposed minimization procedures in a couple of different
ways.
First, NARA regulations do contemplate the destruction of records by court order, which could encompass FISC-ordered retention minimization. 7 Those regulations, however, also incorporate
additional requirements and safeguards depending upon whether
the records to be destroyed by court order have been appraised by
NARA archivists as either temporary or permanent records, or
whether their value has not been assessed at all (the latter rec8 ). "When required by court
ords are categorized as "unscheduled""
order (i.e., order for expungement or destruction)," these NARA
regulations provide, "an agency may destroy temporary records
before their NARA-authorized" destruction date.99 In cases of
court orders providing for the destruction of permanent or "unscheduled" records, NARA regulations provide that the "agency
must notify" NARA and "[i]f the records have significant historical value, NARA will promptly advise the agency of any concerns
over their destruction." 100
Second, there are several NARA-approved records schedules
that expressly contemplate the possible premature destruction of
records pursuant to FISA minimization procedures. These approved schedules, however, do not disclose any exploration of the
pose, continued retention of this data is necessary to comply with preservation obligations
in civil litigation challenging the program, including court orders entered in two of those
cases.").
97. 36 C.F.R. § 1226.14(e) (2015).
98. See id. § 1220.18 (2015) (defining "unscheduled records" as "[flederal records
whose final disposition has not been approved by NARA" and noting that "[s]uch records
must be treated as permanent until a final disposition is approved").
99. Id. § 1226.14(e) (emphasis added).
100. Id.
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question of whether the retention limitations in such minimization procedures ought to properly override the federal records
laws.
One publicly available records schedule, for example, covers
NSA signals intelligence ("SIGINT'') records and data." The
schedule contains several categories of SIGINT records whose
historical value NARA assessed in different ways."°2 Raw intercepted communications, for example, are temporary records that
NSA need only retain "so long as data may be of intelligence interest," while "serialized" SIGINT intelligence reports are treated
as permanent records.' Within the records schedule, however, an
exception is added for several record categories that states: "[a]ny
data that contains, or could contain, U.S. person information has
legal ramifications. There are strict timelines for retention of this
data, and it must be handled in accordance with . . .any special
minimization procedures that govern the retention of that data."' 4 As an example, it states that "[f]or data collected pursuant
to ...(FISA) or Protect America Act (PAA), retention may only be
done in accordance with the minimization procedures for that data." 05
Crucially, this "exception" for destruction pursuant to minimization procedures applies even to categories of NSA SIGINT records that NARA archivists assessed as having such historical
value that they should be permanent federal records that could
otherwise never be destroyed."6 The significance of this assessment is hard to overestimate. Despite a commonly held belief that
NARA maintains a significant portion of government records for
historical research, in fact less than 3 percent of federal records
are treated as permanent records that are preserved forever."°7

101. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Request for Records Disposition Authority, No. N1-457-08-1
(Jan. 1, 2009), https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/depart
ment-of-defense/defense-agencies/rg-0457/nl-457-08-001 sfll 5.pdf
[hereinafter
NSA
SIGINT Records Schedule].
102. Id. at 1-5.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2, 4.
107. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-742, FEDERAL RECORDS: NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND SELECTED AGENCIES NEED TO STRENGTHEN E-MAIL MANAGEMENT 6 (2008)
("Of the total number of federal records, less than 3 percent are designated permanent.").
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One of these "permanent" NSA record categories is SIGINT
"Policy and Program Records."'' 8 In its appraisal report, NARA
archivists determined that these records should be permanently
preserved because they contain "unique and important documentation on the formulation and development of SIGINT policy,"
and this group of records "[r]etains significance for documenting
legal rights despite the passage of time" and, among other things,
they "document the development and implementation of policies
resulting from decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
1 9
Court.""
In addition, NARA also highlighted that "SIGINT policy
[is] highly controversial at this time, and is likely to remain so.""'
Despite this, neither the schedule, nor NARA's appraisal report,
indicates any hesitation at concluding that such records can nevertheless be summarily destroyed pursuant to minimization procedures as the schedule allows.
A publicly available FBI records schedule similarly incorporates FISA minimization procedures covering the disposition of
electronic surveillance data, including "audio, video and other
electronic technologies."11' 1 The schedule provides for a general
eleven-year retention period for covered records, with an added
requirement that prior to any such destruction, the FBI "will
evaluate the electronic surveillance material related to each case
to determine whether or not the records have historical value. If
so, the records will be proposed for permanent retention under a
separate disposition authority.""' 2 Yet, despite these assessments
the records schedule contains an overriding note that "[a]ll information obtained by the FBI pursuant to the orders of a Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is subject to the Standard
Minimization Procedures approved by the FISC" and "FISA information may be destroyed at any time if the FBI" makes certain
determinations. 113

108. NSA SIGINT Records Schedule, supra note 101, at 4.
109. Memorandum from Margaret Hawkins, NARA, Agency: National Security Agency,
Subject: N1-457-08-1, Oct. 20, 2008. The author obtained the NARA appraisal via FOIA
and is available at http://www.dcoxfiles.com/n1457081d.pdf.
110. Id.
111. FBI, Request for Records Disposition Authority, No. N1-065-03-2, at 1 (July 12,
2004).
112. Id. at 2-3.
113. Id. at 2. In particular, the note states that pursuant to the FISC-approved minimization procedures,
FISA information may be destroyed at any time if the FBI determines that:
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Yet another publicly available FBI records schedule encompasses FISA data and records that should not have been acquired.'14 Specifically, it covers: "FISA-acquired information
collected under an order" that "does not meet the terms of the order (for instance, the collection begins or ends after the time
frame of the order or a typographical error has directed the surveillance to the wrong individual or facility), that was collected in
error, or suffers from any other legal defect." 1 5 The approved
"[d]isposition" for such records is "TEMPORARY' and the instruction is to "DELETE/DESTROY' within "60 days of informing
the FISC of the existence of the materials."1 6
For NARA, the question becomes whether, given its unique responsibilities and statutory authorities, it has done enough to ensure that the letter and spirit of the federal records laws are being followed to the greatest extent possible. Given public concerns
over surveillance programs, for which there is limited transparency, NARA is in a unique position to help ensure sufficient records are maintained for long-term accountability.
III. PREVENTING ACCOUNTABILITY MINIMIZATION
A. Handschu Precedent:"In Accordance With Law"
Just as historical attempts to evade recordkeeping laws provide
useful context in assessing current policies on retention of surveillance data, a seminal federal case on government surveillance
of political activity-Handschu v. Special Services Division"7provides a striking illustration of the question of whether india) the information is not pertinent to an authorized responsibility, duty, or function of the FBI... or the United States intelligence community and is unlikely to become so;
b) the information is not of foreign intelligence value ...
c) the information does not contain evidence of a criminal offense ...
d) the information does not contain material that is potentially exculpatory of a criminal defendant;
e) the information does not include privileged communications; and
f) the information is not subject to any rules or requirements under a
FISC order which would preclude its immediate destruction.

Id.
114.

FBI, Request for Records Disposition Authority, No. N1-065-09-9, at 2 (Jun. 25,

2009).
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

2017]

I WANT MY FILE

vidual rights are protected best by preservation or destruction of
surveillance records and provides an example of a reasonable, elegant solution.
Handschu is a federal class action originally filed in 1971 challenging the surveillance activities of the New York Police Department ("NYPD"); it continues to this day." 8 In 1985, after
years of litigation and negotiation, the parties proposed a settlement to the court, which ultimately became known as the "Handschu Guidelines.""' 9 The court's review of the settlement dealt, in
part, with the question of what should become of the NYPD records themselves, which documented surveillance of political
groups, including the Black Panthers and the Young Lords. 2 '
On the issue of whether to preserve or destroy the records,
Judge Haight noted, "an almost paradoxical reversal in the parties' positions has taken place during the course of the litigation.""' "The complaint, filed in 1971," Judge Haight continued,
"specifically sought the destruction of the NYPD's political files,"
but the "[d]efendants resisted that prayer. The police wished to
keep its files.""'2 In 1974, however, New York State enacted its
Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL"), the state equivalent of the
federal FOIA."' The court noted,
The passage of the state statute, occurring during the postWatergate atmosphere of increased inquiries into governmental misconduct, brought about 180-degree changes of course on the part of
the present litigants. The plaintiffs, now regarding the police files
"as a precious historical and political resource," ... stopped demanding that the police files be destroyed, and insisted instead that they
be preserved and revealed. Defendants now wish to destroy the
files." 4

118. Id. at 329. As Judge Haight noted in 2007, "There will be a Handschu class action
and a judge of this Court in charge of it for as long as New York City stands." Handschu v.
Special Servs. Div., 475 F. Supp. 2d 331, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
119. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
120. Id. at 1384-85.
121. Id. at 1411-12.
122. Id. at 1412.
123. The New York Freedom of Information Law is codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. L. §§ 8490 (2016).
124. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1412 (citation omitted). The court was quoting Paul G.
Chevigny, Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735,
748 (1984). Chevigny's article noted that the Handschu case was not unique in this regard,
stating, "preservation of the files against the wishes of the police who claim that they
would prefer to destroy them has become a major issue in many cases, often more important than any other relief." Id.
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The court noted that during negotiations the NYPD "sought
blanket authority to destroy the files outright," while the plaintiffs "pointedly declined to negotiate a settlement which would
authorize destruction of records in derogation of the rights12' of
5 the
statutes.'
preservation
and
disclosure
existing
public under
The settlement language the court finally blessed avoided any
ad hoc, court-ordered solution, but simply provided for the "disposition" of the files "in accordance with law."'26 Judge Haight identified the relevant laws, including the New York FOIL and the
relevant records law established under the New York City Charter, which, like the federal records laws, required that a neutral
department of records assess the value of records in determining
how long they should be preserved.'2 7 "The upshot of the settlement," the court concluded,
is that no intelligence or political files, pre-1955 or post-1955, can be
destroyed without the express approval of the City's commissioner of
records ... who is specifically charged by the Charter to base his determination "on the potential administrative, fiscal, legal, research
or historical value of the record." ... I will not assume that the police
commissioner would disregard the law by disposing of police records
without seeking the requisite approval; nor will I assume that the
commissioner of records ... would not take [his] responsibilities seriously when confronted with such a request.

B. Recommendations on BalancingInterests
What follows are some provisional thoughts on ways in which
the competing interests of privacy, security, the "right to know,"
and historical accountability can be meaningfully reconciled in relation to more advanced forms of surveillance data in accordance
with law.

125. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1412 (quoting plaintiffs brief).
126. Id. at 1392-93.
127. Id. at 1412-13.
128. Id. at 1413-14. As a brief coda on the story of these records, in 2014, a historian
from Baruch College writing a book on the Young Lords submitted a FOIL request for these records. The response from the NYPD, however, was that they were unable to find
them. See Nick Pinto, The NYPD's Records of Its Own Misbehavior Have Mysteriously
Vanished, VILLAGE VOICE (May 20, 2016, 12:29 PM), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/
the-nypds-records-of-its-own-misbehavior-have-mysteriously-vanished-8639201.
During
litgation over the lost files in 2016, however, the city located the files in a Queens warehouse. See Joseph Goldstein, Old New York Police Surveillance Is Found, Forcing Big
Brother Out of Hiding, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/
nyregionlold-new-york-police-surveillance-is-found-forcing-big-brother-out-of-hiding.html.
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As an initial measure, surveillance data in all forms should be
treated as records subject to the federal records laws. 12 9 The potential evasion of these laws by categorizing documents or data as
nonrecords should be avoided at all costs."' To be clear, this
would not necessarily require that any data be retained any longer than it is currently. Instead, it would simply ensure that all
such data is subject to records schedules to decrease the risk that
data of significant value are destroyed without notice to, and authorization from, NARA and the Archivist.
NARA and agencies should also document retention periods for
such data in clearly defined records schedules, perhaps organized
by surveillance programs, to ensure that approvals of destruction
are unambiguous to NARA, the agency, and, where possible, the
public. Currently it is unclear, for example, whether controversial
NSA programs are covered by public schedules, such as the NSA
records schedule governing SIGINT data,1 31 or none at all. Requiring more clearly defined schedules would ensure greater transparency about the breadth and type of data agencies are preserving or destroying.' 2
More broadly, NARA, the Attorney General, and FISC should
work to meaningfully reconcile the federal records laws with procedures designed to limit retention to protect privacy. In particular, NARA should revisit its apparent conclusion-based on publicly available records schedules described above 133-that the
federal records laws ought to yield to FISC minimization procedures. The Attorney General, who is responsible for adopting
minimization procedures, and the FISC, who is responsible for

129. See 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012 & Supp. II 2015) (defining records).
130. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. More broadly, this author and others have argued for abolishing the "nonrecord" category altogether. See Cox, supra note 46,
at 174 ("Congress could control misuse of the 'nonrecord' category, for example, by expanding the statutory definition of 'record' to encompass more, if not all, agency documents.");
see also GARY M. PETERSON & TRUDY HUSKAMP PETERSON, ARCHIVES & MANUSCRIPTS:
LAW 15 (1985) ("Perhaps the best approach is to define all agency documents as records"
and authorize destruction of marginal documents through records schedules).
131. See NSA SIGINT Records Schedule, supra note 101.
132. It could also ensure that NARA's appraisal of the value of such data for assessing
proper retention periods-which would vary from program to program-is fully informed
and accurate.
133. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
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approving them,"' should take the federal records laws into consideration in their analysis.
To be clear, NARA and FISC could ultimately conclude that
FISC retention minimization ought to overrule any inconsistency
with the federal records laws. Support for such a conclusion could
come from passages in FISA that provide for surveillance orders
'
"notwithstanding any other law."135
Or on a more general theory
that it is "assume[d] that Congress is aware of existing law when
it passes legislation" and therefore Congress was impliedly superseding any conflicting, preexisting recordkeeping laws when it established retention minimization in FISA in 1978." If this is the
position of FISC or NARA, then, they ought to address it transparently. Their failure to do so is inconsistent with guidance that
courts "should be mindful of the statutory scheme governing dis1 7 In particular, the Third Circuit
posal of government records.""
has noted that in issuing confidentiality or protective orders
"[c]ourts must exercise caution" so as "not to demand" that an
agency "destroy government documents.., in conflict with [an
agency's] duty to obey the requirements" of the federal records
laws."13
Any argument that FISA was intended to supersede the federal
records laws is suspect. Generally, a court must read potentially
conflicting "statutes to give effect to each if [the court] can do so
' FISA and the federal
while preserving their sense and purpose."139
records laws are not "irreconcilably conflicting" and both provide
flexibility. 40 FISA's legislative history, for example, acknowledges

134. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (defining minimization procedures as "specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General"); id. § 1806(0 (2012) (establishing a court review procedure "notwithstanding any other law"); Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency,
965 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104-05 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing the "notwithstanding any other
law" language in finding that "FISA preempts the common law doctrine of the state secrets privilege").
135. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) ("Notwithstanding any other law, the President,
through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance.").
136. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
137. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kronos, Inc., 620 F.3d 287, 303 (3d Cir.
2010).
138. Id. at 304; see also Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Jupiter Grp. Capital Advisors, LLC, No.
11-00291, 2012 WL 668830, at *5-6 (D. Haw., Feb. 29, 2012) (remanding issue of protective order containing a document destruction requirement back to magistrate judge to
consider restrictions of the federal records laws).
139. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); see also LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 97589 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS

29 (2011) (discussing standards for repeals by implication).
140. Watt, 451 U.S. at 266; EIG, supranote 139, at 29.
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that it will not always be feasible for "retention" minimization to
be accomplished through actual destruction. 1 Retention is just
one in a suite of minimization tools. As David Kris and J. Douglas
Wilson note:
The legislative history further explains that there are "a number of
means and techniques which the minimization procedures may require to achieve the purpose set out in the definition," including "but
not limited to" the "destruction of unnecessary information acquired," or the use of "provisions with respect to what may be filed
and on what basis, what may be retrieved and on what basis, and
what may be disseminated, to whom and on what basis.' 42

Indeed, examples of this are the amendments to minimization
procedures to allow for lengthy retention periods consistent with
litigation preservation obligations. When subject to enhanced restrictions on use and access, they provide concrete illustrations of
the flexible use of different minimization tools to achieve the
larger goal.'43 Further, the amended minimization procedures also
suggest that the Attorney General and the FISC have not concluded that FISA simply supersedes any potentially conflicting
legal obligations.
Also important to the "right to know," the Attorney General
and NARA should also consider the proper impact of the thousands of FOIA requests the NSA has received in the aftermath of
public disclosures related to NSA surveillance programs. Preservation obligations created by FOIA requests are treated under
the federal records laws in a manner similar to litigation holds,
for which the FISA minimization procedures were amended. Under NARA regulations, for example, the "unlawful" destruction of
records is defined to include the "disposal of a record subject to a
FOJA request" in addition to records subject to litigation holds.'
141. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 56 (1978) (discussing destruction "where feasible"); see also DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

AND PROSECUTIONS § 9:5 (2016) (noting that with retention minimization "[o]utright physical destruction" is "not always necessary").
142. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 141, at § 9.5 (quoting legislative history).
143.

See, e.g., NSA SECTION 702 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 71, at 8 (re-

quiring preservation of data "subject to a preservation obligation in pending or anticipated
administrative, civil, or criminal litigation" while heightening restrictions on use and access). For FISA-related records that NARA has assessed to be of permanent value, similar
restrictions on access or use as an alternative to destruction could potentially include
transfer to NARA custody and control. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
The Archivist is empowered for example to "accept for deposit" records the Archivist determines to "have sufficient historical or other value to warrant their continued preservation by the United States Government." 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
144. 36 C.F.R. § 1230.3(b) (2016).
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Further, NARA-approved General Records Schedules provide for
more lengthy retention periods for records subject to FOIA requests in order to reflect the statute of limitations for FOIA actions.145
Decades of FOIA litigation, in fact, provide a lengthy exercise
in the interplay between the "right to know," national security
and privacy concerns, relationships which evolve over time.14
Classified information will eventually become declassified and the
balance of privacy considerations often changes over time. In order for a FOIA requester to properly and fully satisfy their right
to know, however, the records must survive.'47
Finally, the Attorney General and NARA should ensure, at the
very least, that minimization procedures incorporate a reference
to federal records obligations in order to ensure compliance. In
many cases, approved records schedules might already provide
relevant approval. In other cases, however, a reference to recordkeeping obligations would ensure that the issue is not overlooked
and that the data and records at issue have been properly scheduled. Moreover, even if the surveillance data itself is destroyed,
either due to minimization procedures or approved records
schedules, NARA should aim to enhance accountability by ensuring that agencies heighten their documentation of the larger surveillance programs and the scope of the data being collected. This
simply ensures compliance with the most basic statutory recordkeeping duty-to "make and preserve" records that provide "adequate and proper documentation" sufficient to protect the legal
rights of "persons directly affected by the agency's activities."'48

145. See NARA, General Records Schedule 4.2, Information Access and Protection Records, at 49-50 (Jan. 2017), https://www.archives.gov/files/records-mgmt/grs/grsO4-2.pdf
(providing for a six-year retention period for FOIA case files including "copies of requested
records").
146. The (b)(1) FOA exemption protects properly classified information from public
disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012). Similarly, the (b)(6) FOIA exemption protects private information in circumstances in which privacy rights outweigh interests in public disclosure. Id. § 552(b)(6).
147. See generally Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S.
136, 139 (1980) (holding that FOIA only requires agencies to disclose agency records for
which they have retained possession and control).
148. 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012). In doing so, NARA and agencies should consider the possibility of retaining representative samples to ensure a record of the type and extent of
data collected on individuals.
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CONCLUSION

In the end, it is possible that given all of the relevant complexities and conflicting incentives and the heightened dangers to privacy posed by advanced surveillance techniques, that the proper
balance between privacy, security, and the "right to know" is not
far off from the current state of affairs. What seems apparent,
however, is that the intersection of these forces has not been directly and adequately confronted and addressed. The federal records laws are often overlooked, but the historic disclosures of
sweeping government surveillance programs in recent years highlights the need for ensuring long-term accountability. The public
controversy over these programs provides an opportunity to ensure that the balance is right, an opportunity that should not be
squandered.

